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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of 
the persons and estates of 
ERNEST HEMINGWAY O'HARE, 
:BJLIZABETH TALBOT, NICOLLE 
TALBOT, MICHELLE TALBOT,. 
and EMELINE IRENE TALBOT, 
minors. 
BRIEF OF 
APPELANT 
Civil No. ___________ _ 
STA':rEl\fENT OF POINTS REL1ED UPON BY 
PETITIONER AND APPELLANT 
1. That the Court erred in making and entering that 
portion of its decree and order dated the 8th day of Oc-
tober, 1958, which reads as follows: 
''IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Court 
declines to make an-y order concerning the guard-
ianship of the persons of the said Talbot minorS-
herein for the reason and upon the grounds that 
each child has a surviving parent who has custody 
of said child and that jurisdiction in this matter 
lies exdusively in the Juvenile Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Utah."' (R. 6}. 
2. That th~ Court erred in refusing and failing to 
hear and take testimony and evidence pertaining to the 
best interests of said minor·s with relation to and in re-
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2 
gard to the appointment of a-guardian of the persons of 
said ~inors,--and in.- failing and refusing to take jurisdic-
tion and make an appropriate d~cre~ and ord~r respect-
ing such guardianship of the persons of said minors. 
(R. 16, 17 & 18). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This iH an act:ion, by petition of Charles Sweeny, 
the matet:naLgrandfather for the appointment of himself 
as guardian of the persons and estates of the above 
minors. 
The appeal presented herewith, involves purely a 
legal proposition .. concerning_ the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court to appoint guardians of the persons of chil· 
dren under 18 years of age. There are no disputed 
factual situations concerned herein, and a transcript of 
the evidence would- in no way aid the Court in its decision 
on this appeal. Counsel for Verden L. Talb~t (herein~ 
after referred to as "Talbot") who filed the objections 
and cross-petition concurs in this ·statenlent. The-
mother of the minors was divorced from Talbot on May 
26, 1958, which would have, except tor her prior death, 
become final on August 26, 1958. 
Under the terms of the decree- (Emeline Talbot, vs. 
Verden L. Talbot, Civil No. 8573, Cache County District 
Court.) the plaintiff, . Inother, was awarded the EX-
CLUSIVE care, . custody and control of the four Talbot 
children. The two 0 'Hare children, one of which was 
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3 
killed with his mother, were by the first husband of Mrs. 
rralbot. 
Talbot was restrained from in any way molesting 
his wife, and was enjoined and restricted from entering 
on the home premises occupied by the family until fur-
ther order of the Court. 
:.Mrs. Talbot left for Salt Lake City on August 13, 
1958 to complete final arrangements for a voyage of 
herself and all of her children to France, leaving the four 
r_ralbot children with an aunt at Lewiston. On the even-
ing of the next day, returning to Cache Valley, she and 
her older son Charles Sweeny O'Hare were killed in an 
automobile accident near Wellsville, and the other son, 
Ernest Hemingway 0 'Hare was seriously and probably 
permanently injured. Thereupon, Talbot took custody 
of the four Talbot minors, and the court below, in its 
order, found that he had such custody, as will more fully 
appear under ARGUMENT. 
The estates of all of said minors, excepting the tort 
claim against the Utah By-Products Company, resulting 
from the accident, has been furnished solely by the 
petitioner, Charles Sweeny, the income from which has 
been largely if not solely the entire means of support of 
the Talbot family for some years. He commenced these 
proceedings for the guardianship for the protection of 
their estates, and as incidental thereto, also requested 
guardianship of the persons of the minors alleging that 
the father ,also the step father of the O'Hare children) 
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was not a fit and proper :person to be appointed guardian 
of their persons or estates. 
rrhe oldest living child ·(Ernest) )is 11 years~ and the 
youngest one is three. 
At the. hearing on the petition, objections and cross-
petition, on September 29, 1958, and wholly upon the 
cross-examination alone of Talbot (called as a hostile 
witness by petitioner) the court announced that he was 
ready to appoint a guardian of the estates, but not the 
persons, of the mino~s. It was then stipulated by all 
parties that Cache Y alley Branch, \Yalker Bank & Trust 
Company be appointed guardian of the estates of said 
nunors. The court then declined to make any ruling, 
either upon the testimony before it, or any testimony and 
evidence which may be produced, upon the matter of the 
guardianship of the persons of the minors. 
A ttonwys for petitioner then made a detailed offer 
of proof in substance as follo\\·s: (R. beginning at 13). 
(To prove) that the reputation Yerden L. Tal-
bot, cross petitioner, hereinafter referred to as 
Talbot. "·as bad as to being law abiding, and as to 
fitness to act as guardian, and as to sobriety and 
In oral character: that he was not a fit person to 
act as guardian. and that such was his reputation 
in his conununit~-: that he Inistreated tlie children 
he f'ought to act as guardian -for: that he un-
nece~sarily re1nained away from home for long 
periods; that ofticers had to be called to the home 
to protect the fmnilr from him; that he, in his 
wife ·s divorce was not permitted the usual rights 
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of visitation with his children; that he engaged in 
bootlegging; that he associated with women of ill-
repute; all of which more fully appears in the 
record. 
The court then refused the offer and made the order 
appealed fron1. 
ARGUMENT 
The two state~nent of points relied on by appellant 
are so closely allied that no good purpose could be 
accomplished by separate treatment, and therefore will 
be considered as consolidated under the single question 
presented by this appeal, i.e. does the juvenile court, in 
a case such as this, have the exclusive jurisdiction to ap-
point a guardian of the person of a minor~ Or to put 
the matter conversely - did the district court, in this 
case, have jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the 
persons of the minors, or either of them"? 
It is apparent that the court below refused to take 
jurisdiction of the matter of the guardianship of the 
persons of such minors due to the provisions of 55-10-5, 
DCA 1953: 
''The juvenile court shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction in all cases relating to the neglect, 
dependency and delinquency of children who are 
under eighteen years of age ... and the custody, 
detention, guardianship of the person, trial and 
care of such neglected, dependent and delinquent 
children, and the employment of children as pro-
vided by law." 
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We are only concerned with the catagory of de-
pendency which is defined in 55-10-6 UCA 1953, (so far 
as applicable here) as" a child whose custody is in ques-
tion or dispute''. 
The question presented by this appeal, is the same 
as presented by the case before this court in In Re State 
in Interest of Johnson, (Ltah) 175 P. 2d 486, which 
held: 
"\Yhen the custody is conceded to be in the parent, 
but action is instituted to have the custody 
changed to another as a protection to the- child, 
custody is not in question or dispute as contem-
plated by the statute." 
The court below made a specific finding in its order 
that the n1inors were then in the custody of a natural 
parent, so that this n1atter falls squarely within the 
ruling of the Johnson case (supra). ~lpplying the rule 
announced hy this court in Re State (rtah) 110 P. 2d 
11:2. it at once becomes perfectly apparent that the juve-
nile court had no jurisdiction whatsoeYer. So that if the 
portion of the order appealed fron1 be adopted, we are 
at once faced "~ith the dile1na that neither court has 
juri~didion and the matter of a guardianship of the 
pPr~ollf' of the n1inors could neYer bemne settled so long 
Hf' t})('~· WPI'<' not :wtnall~· dependent. neglected or de-
linquent. 
:l:l-10-rl UCA 1953 contains a saving clause which 
111<'<'1~ our f'ituation: 
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sub ( 4) ''Nothing herein contained shall deprive 
other courts of the right to determine the custody 
of children upon writs of habeas corpus, or when 
such custody is incidental to the determination of 
causes in such courts. '' 
The order of the court below forces another in-
consistency which only to mention points up the position 
of appellant. We submit that it is entirely clear that our 
juvenile courts have absolutely no jurisdiction to appoint 
guardians of minors estates. Thus in every guardian-
ship matter involving both types the jurisdiction of two 
distinct courts of record must always be invoked. Such 
is not the law of this State. 
Furthermore, if the lower court's rule is adopted, 
we may appropriately ask: What becomes of 75-13-12, 
UCA 1953 ~ This statute in part states: 
''The district court for each county, when it ap-
pears necessary or convenient may appoint guard-
ians for the persons and estates, or either of them, 
of minors who have no guardian legally appointed 
by will or deed,'' etc. 
This, or similar statutes have been in force, and 
constantly practiced ever since at least 1888 wherein 
(Compiled laws of Utah, 1888, Vol.1, page 103) it reads: 
''Probate courts, in their respective counties shall 
have jurisdiction in the settlements of the estates 
of descendents, and in matters of guardianship 
and other like matters." 
That was legislation by The Congress of the United 
States, and it is interesting to note that in the Edmunds -
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Tucker Law (same volume, page 117) the Congress dis-
approved and annulled all of laws of the Utah Legislative 
Assembly confering jurisdiction on probate courts, 
4 4 
other than in respect of estates of deceased per.:;ons, 
and in respect of the guardianship of the persons and 
property of infants,'' etc. 
When the utah Constitution was adopted on M_ay 
8, 1H!l;> the Convention adopted what it called a "Sched-
ule'' for the conversion from Territorial existence to 
Statehood (Proceedings- Constitutional Convention, 
1895, Y ol. 2, page 1881) and among other matters pro-
dded that: 
""\\nen the State is admitted into the Union, and 
the District Courts in the respective districts are 
organized, the books, records, papers and pro-
ceedings of the probate court in each county, and 
all causes and matters of administration pending 
therein, upon the expiration of the term of office 
of the Probate Judge, on the second Monday in 
January, 1896. shall pass into the jurisdiction and 
possession of the District Court". etc. 
In the "Laws of the Territory of Utah". (Laws of 
Utah. lSS-1- p. -1-;)l ), the :2Gth Session of the Legislative 
Af;~Pmh]y adopted language identical to that which ap-
pear~ in 75-13-12, rcA 1953. except that the term 
''probate court'' wa~ used, and '·Territor~~·· was used 
instead of ''~tate''. 
In view of the historical background, and long and 
continued usage, it is inconceivable that 75-13-12, UCA 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
1953 was repealed by irnplication when 55-10-5-, UCA 
1953 became law. 
Juvenile courts in Utah seem to be the creatures /of 
the Sixth Legislature of Utah, 1905 (L. Utah, 1905 p. 
182). This created juvenile courts in cities of the first 
and second class, and provided that such courts shall 
have jurisdiction "in all cases relating to children, in-
cluding juvenile delinquents''. 
From this modest beginning, the Compiled Laws o~ 
Utah, 1917, p. 439 represented a significant develop-
ment of the juvenile court movement in Utah, wherein 
it provided as to jurisdiction: 
"The juvenile court shall have jurisdiction in all 
cases relating to the custody, detention, guardian-
ship of the person, probation, neglect, dependency, 
delinquency, examination, trial, and care of chil-
dren who are under eighteen years of age'', etc. 
· Then came the sweeping Act of the Session Laws 
of Utah, for 1931, p. 51 and repealed specified chapters 
of previous enactments, BUT DID NOT REPEAL ANY 
PREVIOUS ACT RELATING TO THE APPOINT-
MENT OF GUARDIANS. It was in this 1931 Act that 
we first find the words: 
''The juvenile court shall have exclusive original 
jurisdiction (ours) in all cases relating to the 
neglect, dependency and delinquency of children 
who are under eighteen years of age", etc. 
And it was in that Act wherein the saving clause 
preserved in other courts jurisdiction when custody is 
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irlCideD;tal to the determinati.on of ~auses in sueh courts. 
And likewise it defined a dependent child to include one 
"whose custody is in question or ·dispute". 
This court has held (In re: Cowan's Estate, .99 P. 
2d 605, and in other cases) that long usage and practice 
will not be passed over lightly by the Supreme Court in 
interpreting a statute. And now certainly, we submit 
that the general statute providing for the appointment 
of Guardians of the persons of minors by the district 
courts, was not repealed by the Juvenile Court Act. 
It is a certainty that the question here presented is 
either (1) a civil matter, or (2) a probate matter. As-
sume it to be civil- then Art. VIII, Sec. 7 of our Con-
stitution provides: 
''The District Court shall have original juris-
diction in all matters civil and criminal, not ex-
cepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by 
law;" (Note : There is no exceptions). 
· Assume it to be a probate n1atter- is jurisdiction 
in this case prohibited by law~ In addition to the pro-
visions of 75-13-12 (supra) we are met with 75-1-6 UCA 
1953: 
''The district and Supreme Courts and the judges 
thereof sitting in probate and guardianship mat-
ters (ours) shall exercise all such powers. (ours), 
consistent with the provisions of this title", etc. 
The juvenile court statute is not contained in that 
title. We think it appropriate to quote the following 
I 
1 
l 
' 
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fron1 this Court. In Re Rice's Estate, 182 P. 2d 111: 
''The qu-estion of the jurisdiction and powers of 
District Courts in this state have been before this 
court on numerous occasions and particularly 
with respect to the powers, rights and remedies 
of a court when it js dealing with an action 
brought under the provisions of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, the Code of Criminal Procedure, or 
the Probate Code (ours). There is little need to 
again discuss the extent of the jurisdiction 
granted to District Courts by the Constitution of 
the State of Utah and the statutes consistent 
therewith. 'rhat District Courts have original 
jurisdiction in matters, civil, criminal, probate, 
a:nd gu,ardianship, (ours) is admitted~'. 
It is no answer to the question at hand to state that 
petitioner has his remedy under the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile courts. He does not have such remedy 
because such courts have no jurisdiction over probate 
matters; and guardianships where uncontested are pro-
bate matters ,and when contested are tried as civil mat-
ters under our Code of Civil Procedure. The court below 
had not the right or power to attempt to force appellant 
into two separate proceedings. 
This Court in the Rice case (supra) after stating 
standards to be met in determining the nature of an 
action stated: 
''If these standards are met, then the court can 
determine which is the appropriate arm but it 
cannot refuse the use of either. Had ·the court 
in this action sustained the demurrer on the 
grounds it did not have jurisdiction, it would have 
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denied petitioner the use of either arm, although 
he was entitled to the use of one". 
That the juvenile courts do ~ot have exclusive juris-
diction in matters concerning the custody of juveniles 
becomes clear when we refer to the matter of custody of 
children in divorce casesA We believe that no member of 
the Bar would contend that a divorce court must decide 
the matter of divorce, and then hold that it c0uld not 
deterrnine the matter of the custody of the children. 
We feel that the court below has misc<>neeived the 
nature of the juvenile court Act. ·fhat Act becomes ap-
plicable when facts are alleged or exist giving the State 
the right to step in and take control of the child. That 
is the explicit holding of the Johnson case (supra) : 
''In other words there is no need for the State to 
take control of such a child, as by statute the par-
ent is given that preferential right until adjudi-
cated otherwise. On the other hand if the child 
is not in custody of a natural parent and the con-
testants for its custody are not obligated by law 
to assunw responsibility for its care, it is a child 
whose custody is in question or dispute, requir-
ing the State to consider the clz ild as a dependent 
child as defined in the third definition quoted 
above; and ASSUlliE CO}..:TROL OrER IT ... 
It seems clear that the allegations of the peti-
tion in this case are insufficient to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the jnl'enile court." (ours). 
~rh~· specific finding of the court below appealed 
from, to thE> effect that the custody of the children are 
in a natural parent. n1akes it in1possible, under the 
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ruling of the Johnson case (supra) to invoke the juris-
diction of the juvenile court. Thus, appellant is finds 
himself in the position that the district court will not 
take jurisdiction, and the juvenile court cannot do so 
under the facts alleged in this case. Hence, this appeal. 
Respectfully Submitted 
Preston and Harris 
and B. H. Harris 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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